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INTRODUCTION 
In today’s highly litigious legal landscape, one might doubt that there could ever 
be an “open, fair, voluntary” agreement between copyright owners and service 
providers to police infringement.1  Congress nevertheless envisioned such a 
consensus when it developed § (i) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA): “Conditions for [Safe Harbor] Eligibility.”2  An often-overlooked 
provision of the DMCA, § 512(i) directs right holders and Internet service 
providers to work together and agree on “standard technical measures” to “identify 
or protect copyrighted works.”3  In addition to being the product of consensus, 
these measures must be “available . . . on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms” 
and also “not impose substantial costs . . . or substantial burdens.”4  Although 
ostensibly thorough, these guidelines are too imprecise and elusive to actually 
guide service providers and right holders toward a consensus; the term “standard 
technical measures” remains undefined and possibly undefinable more than a 
decade after passage. 
However, right holders and user-generated content sites (UGCs)—the group of 
DMCA “service providers” that pose the greatest problems for copyright 
enforcement—already employ audio and video fingerprinting technology as a 
standard measure to police infringement.5  Both groups employ this technology 
both to conduct general policing and also to operate repeat infringer policies, which 
are separately mandated by § 512(i).6  Already, fingerprinting technology is 
fundamental to the protection of copyrighted works on the Internet.7 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2011, Columbia Law School; B.A. Rhetoric and English, University of 
California—Berkeley. Many thanks to Professor Jane Ginsburg for her helpful input and feedback.  
Thanks also to Stanley Pierre-Louis, Sean Varah and Fred von Lohmann for their suggestions.  Finally, 
many thanks to Timothy A. Cohan, Shanti E. Sadtler and the staff of the Columbia Journal of Law & the 
Arts for their excellent editorial contributions. 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A) (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. § 512(i)(2). 
 4. Id. § 512(1)(2)(B)–(C). 
 5. Content Management Overview, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/content_management 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (“Hundreds of media companies have signed up [for Audio ID and Video ID 
fingerprinting] already.”). 
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1). 
 7. See Content Management Overview, supra note 5.  See also Catherine Applefield Olson, 
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In light of the widespread use of this successful technology and Congress’s 
mandate that the term “standard technical measures” be developed “expeditiously,” 
individual or infrequent holdouts should not obstruct the consensus necessary to 
define the term.8  Although Congress expected that a standards development 
organization would be the key to establishing consensus, no such organization has 
arisen, and parties remain free to agree independently on such measures.9   
This Note will argue that fingerprinting technology should qualify as “standard 
technical measures” under § 512(i), so that right holders and service providers may 
be on notice of their statutory obligations and may continue to develop “best 
practice” applications for that technology. 
Part I will briefly introduce the reader to fingerprinting technology and to the 
general scope and purpose of § 512.  Part II will then expand this general 
discussion to describe how—and whether—§ 512 has come to be understood to 
include UGCs within its scope while right holders continue to accuse UGCs of 
enabling widespread copyright infringement online.10  In response to this 
insecurity, and in an effort to preserve its eligibility, the UGC industry has 
developed sophisticated, technological practices for identifying and protecting 
copyrighted works.11  This Note will argue that, by its widespread use, 
fingerprinting technology satisfies the qualifications for “standard technical 
measures” set out in § 512(i).12  Part III will then uncover legislative history and 
analogous technological and legal developments in an effort to better illuminate the 
definition of “standard technical measures” in light of this existing technology.  
Finally, Part IV concludes with a hypothesis of what “standard technical measures” 
might usefully look like. 
I.  THE LEGAL BACKGROUND:  “STANDARD TECHNICAL 
MEASURES” AND WHAT § 512 WAS MEANT TO DO 
A.  FINGERPRINTING TECHNOLOGY:  A STANDARD TECHNICAL MEASURE? 
At present, the predominant mechanism for digital copyright enforcement of 
audio, visual and audiovisual works depends on the application of digital 
Audible Magic’s Capabilities May Charm the Industry, BILLBOARD, Jan. 11, 2003. 
 8. At the time of passage, Congress mandated that these measures be developed “expeditiously.”  
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998). 
 9. Id. (“The Committee anticipates that these provisions could be developed both in recognized 
open standards bodies or in ad hoc groups.”). 
 10. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting 
YouTube’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that it qualifies for safe harbor immunity 
under the DMCA and is not secondarily liable for user-generated infringement). 
 11. See Content Management Overview, supra note 5. 
 12. Of course, should the Second Circuit determine that YouTube does not qualify as a service 
provider within the scope of § 512, UGCs’ compliance with the “standard technical measures” provision 
will be irrelevant.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (providing requisite “Conditions for eligibility” for service 
providers to acquire and preserve safe harbor protection from liability). 
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“fingerprints” of those works.13  These fingerprints contain unique, identifying 
information about copyrighted works including tempo, tone, pitch and color, 
depending on the nature of the content.14  Once generated and incorporated into an 
expansive database, filtering technology will then filter or scan online content by 
running algorithmic comparisons against works within its referent database.15  
Though imperfect, this “content-based classification” is much more effective than 
simple search term filtering, which would not match infringing content unless the 
file name for the content was titled the same as the file name of the copyrighted 
work.  Versions of this technology vary in their ability to match sound or video 
content that is modified or short in duration, but all perform essentially the same 
function:  scanning the Internet for audiovisual content and comparing that content 
against a database of copyrighted works in search of matches or incidents of 
infringement.16 
Although there is currently no explicit consensus on the application of this 
technology, all major right holders and UGCs apply it in some form.17  This 
universal utilization should be taken to amount to a “broad consensus,” required by 
 13. See Mark Holden, ASCAP’s MediaGuide:  Will it Identify Your Music?, FILM MUSIC MAG. 
(Apr. 11, 2006), http://www.filmmusicmag.com/?p=653. 
 14. See, e.g., Audio Fingerprinting, MUSIC TRACE, http://www.musictrace.de/ 
technologies/fingerprinting.en.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). 
 15. See, e.g., Stan Z. Li, Content-Based Audio Classification and Retrieval Using the Nearest 
Feature Line Method, 8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SPEECH & AUDIO PROCESSING 619 (Sept. 2000); 
Audio Fingerprinting, supra note 14; Audiomatic Identification (AudioID) Via Acoustic Fingerprints, 
FRAUNHOFER IDMT, http://www.idmt.fraunhofer.de/eng/research_topics/ audioid.htm (last visited Nov. 
3, 2010); Auditude’s Content ID Indexing System, AUDITUDE, http://www.auditude.com/products/ (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 16. See supra note 15.  Another similar technology, digital watermarking, “involves embedding 
cryptographic information derived from frames of digital video [or audio] into the video itself.”  Digital 
Video Watermarking:  Technical Overview, MICROSOFT, http://download.microsoft.com/download/ 
d/6/b/d6bde980-5568-4926-8c71-dea63befed64/video_watermk.doc (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).  For the 
moment, the cost and burden of implementing this technology has prohibited its adoption. Id.  
Watermarking will affect the quality of audio or video content (“[a] more secure watermark distorts the 
original video more than a less secure watermark”), demand a massive overhaul of all existing 
nonwatermarked content and demand implementation of a separate filtering system to locate this 
content.  Id.; David Kravets, DRM is Dead, But Watermarks Rise From Its Ashes, WIRED (Jan. 11, 
2008), http://www.wired.com/print/entertainment/music/news/2008/01/sony_music (“[W]atermarking is 
likely to produce fresh, empirical data that copyright material is ping-ponging across peer-to-peer 
sites—data the industry would use in its ongoing bid to tighten copyright controls, and to browbeat 
internet service providers to implement large-scale copyright-filtering operations.”).  Major right holders 
such as Viacom, Inc. argue that watermarking should supplement fingerprinting technology, enabling 
right holders to automatically identify their content, and negating the need for a notice-and-takedown 
system altogether.  See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Real Issues in Viacom v. YouTube, BALKINIZATION (June 
25, 2010), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/06/real-issues-in-viacom-v-youtube.html.  Watermarking 
would provide another line of defense against copyright infringement in addition to fingerprinting.  See, 
e.g., Audio Fingerprinting, supra note 14.  However, watermarking is not currently implemented on as 
wide a scale as fingerprinting.  See supra, Balkin.  Furthermore, it would require greater cost and 
proactivity on the part of service providers.  Id.  As such, it does not currently warrant serious 
consideration as a “standard technical measure[],” developed pursuant to a “broad consensus,” available 
“on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms” and without “substantial costs . . . or substantial burdens” 
to service providers.  17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A)–(C). 
 17. See infra Parts II.C–D. 
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subsection (2)(A), if only implicitly.18  Furthermore, the technology’s widespread 
use should serve as prima facie evidence that it is both “available to any person on 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms” and does “not impose substantial 
costs . . . or substantial burdens” on service providers, consistent with subsections 
(2)(B) and (C).19   
Fingerprinting technology appears to satisfy the statutory definition, which 
Congress provided in anticipation that technology would “be the solution to many 
of the issues facing copyright owners and service providers in this digital age.”20  
However, interested parties continue to dispute the appropriate application of the 
technology, thus impeding its definitive characterization as a “standard technical 
measure” in satisfaction of § 512.21  These unsurprising disagreements should not 
eclipse the potential importance of fingerprinting technology to resolving the 
uncertainty of service provider’s “Conditions for eligibility,” and particularly 
UGCs’ eligibility for DMCA safe harbor immunity. 22 
B. SECTION 512:  A COMPLICATED COMPROMISE 
Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 512 via the DMCA in the wake of a suite of 
litigation that sought to determine the liability of Internet service providers (ISPs) 
for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement.23  ISPs sought, among other 
things, immunity from, or at least clarification of, their liability to copyright owners 
for the generation of copies often incidental to their many operations: providing 
connections and transmissions, storing data, caching and indexing or linking 
content.24  The resulting statute carved out exceptions or “safe harbors” from 
liability for digital copies generated by and through the Internet.25  As conceived 
by Congress, limiting ISP liability would ensure “that the efficiency of the Internet 
will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A). 
 19. Id. § 512(i)(2)(B)–(C). 
 20. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998). 
 21. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1105 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009) (arguing that Veoh did not meet the requirements set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)). 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
 23. In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), the court held 
that defendant repair person’s incidental upload of plaintiff’s copyrighted operating system into a 
computer’s random access memory (RAM) constituted infringement.  Subsequently, in Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 
1995), the district court distinguished MAI according to defendants’ relative voluntariness.  Id. at 1368.  
Because Netcom did not take any affirmative action, the copies at issue were noninfringing because 
incidental to Netcom’s working transmission system.  Id.  See also Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 
1998 (DMCA), sec. 202, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512). 
 24. See generally DMCA, 112 Stat. at 2860.  See also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 
(9th Cir. 2004) (stating that Title II of the DMCA “endeavors to facilitate cooperation among Internet 
service providers and copyright owners”). 
 25. The safe harbors provided by Congress in § 512 include:  (a) Transitory digital network 
communications, (b) System caching, (c) Information residing on systems or networks at the direction of 
users and (d) Information location tools.  17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d). 
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will continue to expand.”26 
Conditional to those exemptions, the DMCA provides three affirmative steps to 
ensure that it will benefit only “innocent” service providers: those who neither 
promote, nor have “actual or constructive knowledge” of infringement facilitated 
by their transmission or other services.27  First, under § 512(c), service providers 
must comply with a notice-and-takedown procedure, whereby copyright holders are 
charged with actively locating and notifying service providers of infringing 
material so that the service providers will then “remove or disable access to” that 
infringing material.28  The statute describes the requisite elements of these notices, 
as well as procedures for responding and objecting to them.29  This particular 
provision has garnered substantial attention in the courts, in academia and 
throughout the public, particularly in the blogosphere.30  Though the provision 
remains controversial and the legal standards regulating it are by no means fixed, 
debate and discussion have initiated some momentum toward consistent application 
of these conditions.31 
Affected parties have accepted the basic legal framework and their relative 
burdens, and have instead focused their disputes on the standards informing that 
procedure, in particular the requisite good faith necessary to issue a takedown 
notice, and the level of knowledge service providers demand before assuming their 
obligation to remove content.32  But as of October 2010, at least one major right 
holding party has challenged this basic safe harbor framework as applied to 
 26. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998). 
 27. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
“immunity . . . is not presumptive, but granted only to ‘innocent’ service providers who can prove they 
do not have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement”). 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). 
 29. Id. § 512(c)(3) (prescribing the “Elements of Notification” for issuing a takedown notice), (f) 
(imposing liability for “Misrepresentations” in violation of subsection (c)(3)), (g) (prescribing 
procedures for “Replacement of Removed or Disabled Material and Limitation on Other Liability”). 
 30. See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that § 
512(c)(3)(A)(v) imposes a standard of subjective good faith on the part of copyright holders issuing 
takedown notices); ALS Scan, 239 F.3d 619; Lenz v. Universal Music Grp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (denying a motion to dismiss in light of requirement that copyright holders consider 
fair use before issuing takedown notices); Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela 
Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically 
Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007); Emily Zarins, Notice Versus 
Knowledge Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Safe Harbors, 92 CAL. L. REV. 257 (2004); 
Balkin, supra note 16; Deeplinks Blog, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/archive (last visited Oct. 21, 2010); Liz Gannes, Would Filtering YouTube Make It More 
Liable?, GIGAOM.COM, http://gigaom.com/video/would-filtering-youtube-make-it-more-liable/ (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 31. See, e.g., Rossi, 391 F.3d 1000 (holding that the “good faith belief” in infringement contained 
in a takedown notice be measured under a subjective standard); Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (ruling 
that some consideration of fair use is required prior to issuing a takedown notice under § 512(c)); 
Michael Warnecke, DMCA’s False Notification Provision Gains Traction in Complaints, Case Law, 12 
ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 73 (2007) (describing cases invoking § 512(f)). 
 32. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104–05 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (stating that “knowledge of blatant copyright 
infringement” minimally requires that service providers receive notice of infringement and “be able to 
tell merely from looking at the user’s activities . . . that copyright infringement is occurring”). 
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UGCs.33  In its summary judgment motion against YouTube, Viacom alleged that 
the UGC giant’s direct financial benefit and ability to control infringement 
disqualify it from safe harbor eligibility.34  This argument constitutes a significant 
challenge to presently accepted safe harbor coverage.35  For the moment, the 
challenge has not succeeded in narrowing the scope of safe harbor eligibility. 
Judge Louise Stanton in the Southern District of New York granted YouTube’s 
summary judgment motion, denying Viacom’s claims of vicarious and contributory 
infringement against it.36  Judge Stanton reasoned that YouTube lacked specific 
knowledge of “particular case[es]” of infringement and otherwise satisfied the 
eligibility requirements laid out in § 512(c).37  Rejecting this statutory 
interpretation, Viacom maintains that its arguments have “always been about 
whether intentional theft of copyrighted works is permitted under existing law” and 
has appealed the district court’s interpretation of § 512(c) to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals.38  Should Viacom’s ensuing challenge garner judicial support at 
the appellate level, its claim would not only invalidate generally accepted safe 
harbor eligibility for UGCs, but also would undermine the presumption of 
innocence fundamental to safe harbor immunity at large.39 
For the moment, and assuming that the Second Circuit will not reverse the 
district court’s determination that YouTube does qualify as a “service provider” 
under § 512, UGCs must also satisfy two conditions for eligibility specified in § (i) 
to qualify for safe harbor eligibility.40  They must adopt and implement repeat 
infringer policies, and must further “accommodate[] and . . . not interfere with 
standard technical measures.”41  The extent to which covered service providers 
currently comply with these requirements remains unknown, even to the providers 
themselves, because the requirements lack a solid definition.  As of yet, these 
requirements have not enjoyed nearly the level of controversy or litigious attention 
of the notice-and-takedown provisions of § 512(c) and remain almost entirely 
indeterminate.42  This uncertainty leaves service providers free to articulate novel 
legal standards on one hand, and vulnerable to challenges to their safe harbor 
 33. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Liability and Inapplicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe Harbor Defense, Viacom 
Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS)), 2010 WL 
1004561 [hereinafter Viacom Summary Judgment Motion]. 
 34. Id. at 56–61. 
 35. See also Balkin, supra note 16 (arguing that Viacom’s real argument is that YouTube should 
implement watermarking technology so that Viacom may automatically trace its content on YouTube’s 
server). 
 36. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 37. Id. at 526–27. 
 38. Michael Fricklas, Viacom Statements:  The Court Ruling, VIACOM, http://news.viacom/ 
news/Pages/summaryjudgment.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 39. Covered by subsection § 512(c), “Information residing on systems or networks at the 
direction of users.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. § 512(i). 
 41. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A)–(B). 
 42. See infra Part III. 
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eligibility on the other.43 
Because they pose a considerable threat to copyright holders’ exclusive rights 
and are already foremost in content owners’ sights as targets of litigation, UGCs 
have the greatest incentive to formulate repeat infringer policies and standard 
technical measures, whether or not their safe harbor immunity is revoked. 44  If a 
court removes immunity for a particular UGC or for a type of UGC service, repeat 
infringer policies and standard technical measures may prevent infringement and 
thus minimize actual causes of action against the sites.  But although UGCs have 
incentives to comply with these two provisions whether or not safe-harbor 
immunity is found to apply, a Second Circuit reversal in Viacom v. YouTube would 
negate the UGCs’ obligation to collaborate in forming a definition of “standard 
technical measures,” as well as their statutory obligation to accommodate and not 
interfere with those measures. 
At present, to counter the rapid reproduction and distribution enabled by such 
UGC sites, both sites and copyright owners employ technological measures to 
curtail infringement at a parallel pace.45  Though the entire industry appears to 
employ a variety of substantially similar fingerprinting mechanisms, this 
technology has yet to be explicitly deemed adequate, much less in compliance with 
§ 512(i).46 
The following section will explore the nature of the fingerprinting technology 
that is widespread among UGCs and right holders with a lens toward determining 
whether this technology could, or does, meet the statutory requirements of 
development pursuant to a broad consensus, with reasonable availability and 
without substantial cost.47  In particular, this Note will focus on the first of these 
requirements—development pursuant to a broad consensus—as this appears to 
present the greatest barrier to meeting the statutory definition.48 
 43. Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233, 262 (2009) 
(“[T]he DMCA safe harbors should be interpreted to promote clarity for private planning.  An unclear 
‘safe harbor’ is self-defeating and of no practical use because it cannot guide people in how to avoid 
liability.”) (citing Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 
1314–16 (2002)). 
 44. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. 
YouTube Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS)), 2007 WL 775611 
[hereinafter Viacom Complaint 1]; see also Matt Williams, The Truth and the “Truthiness” About 
Knowing Material Misrepresentation, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 n.20 (2007) (“There are strong 
arguments that YouTube does not qualify for this safe harbor because, inter alia, it is engaged in far 
more than ‘storage’ and YouTube receives direct financial benefit from infringing material that it could 
control.”). 
 45. See supra Part I.A. 
 46. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). 
 48. See, e.g., 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
12B.02[B][3][b] (2008) (“Given the incentives of the various parties whose consensus is required before 
any such technical measures can win adoption, it seems unlikely . . . that the need for any such 
monitoring will eventuate.”). 
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II.  WEB 2.0 TECHNOLOGY:  WHAT IT DOES, HOW IT WORKS AND 
WHY IT MATTERS TO COPYRIGHT 
While it was probably not the original intent of the legislation, Web 2.0 sites and 
UGCs are now generally accepted as falling within the scope of the DMCA.49  
These sites are particularly troubling for copyright holders because users can (and 
do) upload infringing material faster than content owners can find it and demand 
that it be taken down pursuant to § 512(c).50  In response to this unforeseen 
expansion of copyright infringement online, right holders have repeatedly targeted 
UGCs in litigation.51  At present, courts have accepted the safe harbor eligibility of 
UGCs under § 512(c), which covers “Information residing on systems or networks 
at the direction of users.”52  Right holders have instead focused their disputes on 
whether UGCs comply with the notice-and-takedown procedure and otherwise 
meet the statute’s prescribed conditions for eligibility.53  Given the nature of Web 
2.0 technology, UGC sites’ ability to comply with the conditions for eligibility set 
forth in § 512(c) and § 512(i) is uncertain.54   
The DMCA takedown system has been an ineffective method of policing 
infringement, not to mention a source of possible privacy and First Amendment 
violations.  Therefore, content owners and UGCs have begun to develop policies 
and devices for curtailing infringement currently outside the reach of the law.55  
Chief among these are the Principles for User Generated Content Services, which 
explicitly incorporate an expectation that fingerprinting technology will be used to 
 49. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Brief of 
Amici in Support of Verizon’s Opposition to RIAA’s Motion to Enforce at 6, In re Verizon, 240 F. 
Supp. 2d 24 (No. CIV.A.02-MS-0323(JDB)), 2002 WL 32387949 (describing Web 2.0 world as “not 
even a glimmer in anyone’s eye” at the time of passage)), rev’d sub nom. Recording Indus. Ass’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Viacom Summary 
Judgment Motion, supra note 33, at 61 (arguing that the infringement on leading UGC site YouTube 
does not result from any of the specified core functions—transmission, caching, storage and linking—to 
which the DMCA applies); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. You Tube Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527–29 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (holding that YouTube satisfies the safe harbor eligibility requirements under § 512). 
 50. See, e.g., Viacom Complaint 1, supra note 44, at 23. 
 51. See, e.g., id.; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1105 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See infra Part II.A. 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); see Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (explaining that “[i]t is hard to imagine a subject the discussion of which could be more in the 
public interest,” than the use of a copyrighted email archive to inform the public about the problems 
associated with electronic voting machines, which a DMCA takedown notice targeted); Jennifer M. 
Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effect”?  Take-down Notices Under Section 512 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006) 
(reporting on findings from an empirical study of takedown practice and concluding that overbroad 
takedown notices pose policy concerns for the system as a whole); PRINCIPLES FOR USER GENERATED 
CONTENT SERVICES, http://www.ugcprinciples.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2010) [hereinafter UGC 
PRINCIPLES] (providing a leading example of a voluntary agreement between and among copyright 
owners and UGC services for how to limit copyright infringement beyond the notice-and-takedown 
system). 
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police copyright.56  At present, every major right holder and UGC applies 
fingerprinting technology because it is capable of quickly identifying and locating 
infringing content.57  As Congress predicted, “technology is likely to be the 
solution to many of the issues facing copyright owners and service providers in this 
digital age.”58 
To describe how, and whether, technology has met Congress’s expectation, this 
section will begin by providing a brief illustration of what UGCs do and how they 
operate.  Part B will then discuss how UGCs have come to be considered eligible 
for DMCA safe harbor protection by various district courts, despite Viacom’s 
recent challenge.59  Next, Part C will introduce a recent “best practice” initiative to 
redistribute the burden for policing infringement between copyright owners and 
UGC sites.  “The Copyright Principles for UGCs” arguably signifies the closest 
available opportunity for a “broad consensus.”60  Finally, Part D will examine the 
actual operation of fingerprinting measures widely used throughout the industry to 
police and prevent copyright infringement. 
A.  OVERVIEW OF WEB 2.0 TECHNOLOGY AND UGCS 
“Web 2.0” refers to web applications and services that facilitate interactive 
online participation through information sharing, collaboration and interoperability, 
as distinguished from noninteractive sites where users are restricted to passive 
ingestion of information.61  Common examples are collaborative information 
resources, such as Wikipedia.com, and file-sharing sites, such as YouTube.com and 
Vimeo.com.  Web 2.0 technology combines user- and server-side software, such 
that users can input keyword searches, trail information via hyperlinks and 
contribute original audio, visual and/or literary material.62  These capabilities were 
anticipated long before the advent of the Internet.  In his 1948 essay, “As We May 
Think,” Vannevar Bush predicted that we would one day no longer be restricted to 
the associations our authors provide for us, but could, and would, choose our own 
paths.63  In his 1968 essay, “The Death of the Author,” Roland Barthes described 
writing as “a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them 
 56. UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 57. See, e.g., id.; see also Content Management Overview, supra note 5. 
 58. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998); see also About Our Company and Industry, 
MEDIADEFENDER, http://www.mediadefender.com/aboutUs.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (“Internet-
piracy-prevention (IPP) technologies are an emerging means to successfully thwart Internet-based piracy 
and are critical enablers of the distribution of digitized content through legitimate channels.”). 
 59. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A). 
 61. Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0:  Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next 
Generation of Software, O’REILLY (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/ 
oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html. 
 62. See, e.g., Andrew P. McAfee, Enterprise 2.0:  The Dawn of Emergent Collaboration, 47 MIT 
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 3, 21–28 (2006). 
 63. Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, LIFE, Sept. 10, 1945, at 112–24 (originally published in 
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1945). 
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original, blend and clash.”64  Today, users interact with and alter the text of others 
by following hyperlinks, participating in online message boards and even by 
composing e-mail.65  Web 2.0 resources have indisputably altered our social, 
political and economic world.66  They have facilitated cross-global collaboration 
and education, enabling users to share artwork and experiences with persons 
otherwise entirely unconnected to the users themselves.67  However, Web 2.0 
devices have likewise provided a mechanism for the rapid and unauthorized 
exchange of copyrighted works.68 
In particular, the species of Web 2.0 applications that accommodate user-
generated and user-uploaded content (UGCs) has enabled an unforeseen expansion 
of copyright infringement.69  Because infringing content is uploaded at the 
direction of users at large, right holders must either police a highly diffuse target or 
police those sites that facilitate the users’ individual infringements.  As a matter of 
policy, it has proven exceedingly difficult and politically unpopular to contain 
widespread infringement by targeting individual users.70  However, because many 
of those sites are substantially used for noninfringing purposes, UGCs’ liability for 
indirect infringement remains unclear even after the enactment of the DMCA, 
which was intended to resolve many of these issues.71  Copyright owners and 
UGCs have consequently recognized the need to resolve the uncertainty of such 
liabilities.72  In particular, UGCs characterize themselves as service providers 
within the statutory definition of the DMCA and therefore eligible for safe harbor 
eligibility and partially insulated from infringement liability.73 
B.  SAFE HARBOR ELIGIBILITY FOR USER-GENERATED CONTENT SERVICES 
The DMCA broadly defines “service provider” as “a provider of online services 
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”74  Much has been written 
 64. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE—MUSIC—TEXT 146 (Stephen Heath 
trans., 1977). 
 65. See, e.g., GEORGE P. LANDOW, HYPERTEXT 2.0, at 80 (2d ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 
1997). 
 66. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, The Specter of Copyism v. Blockhead Authors:  How User-Generated 
Content Affects Copyright Policy, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2008) (predicting that UGCs will 
drive down costs and increase accessibility and availability for creative content). 
 67. See e.g., WEOWNTV, http://www.weowntv.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 68. See Scott Karp, A Lot of User-Generated Content Is Really User-Appropriated Content, 
PUBLISHING 2.0 (Nov. 18, 2006), http://www.publishing2.com/2006/11/18/a-lot-of-user-generated-
content-is-really-user-appropriated-content/. 
 69. Id.; see also Bell, supra note 66. 
 70. See, e.g., Jonathan Saltzman, BU Student Admits Illegal Downloads, BOSTON.COM (July 31, 
2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/07/31/bu_students_admission_ 
of_illegal_downloads_may_cost_him_45m/. 
 71. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 72. See generally, UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 73. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2006).  This definition includes, but is separate from, those entities 
covered in § 512(a) and (b):  Internet access providers such as Netcom, which communicate material 
through automatic and transitory processes, without selecting, directing or modifying that material.  See 
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about the scope of eligibility for DMCA safe harbors in light of this definition.75  
For example, Professor Jane C. Ginsburg posits facetiously that the term “could 
mean any services offered online, including the services of making copyrighted 
works available to the public.”76  The statute’s legislative history reveals that 
Congress only anticipated web-specific services widely used in the mid- and late-
1990s.  The House Report, for example, provides specific examples limited to 
“providing server space” for traditional online activities such as e-mail and chat 
rooms.77  However, the House Report also indicates that though a traditional media 
operation would not be specifically covered, it would be “to the extent it performs 
functions covered by (j)(1)(B).”78  This clarification seems to foresee the probable 
expansion of DMCA safe harbor coverage to Web 2.0 technologies, even though at 
the time the DMCA was enacted, the Web 2.0 world was “not even a glimmer in 
anyone’s eye.”79  In light of the limited online operations in existence at the time of 
enactment, many scholars doubt not only whether the DMCA should include UGCs 
within the term of “service providers,” but also whether it was ever meant to.80 
Courts have repeatedly construed the very general statutory definition of 
“service providers” to apply to Web 2.0 sites.81  As a leading example, in UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., the plaintiff right holder did not dispute 
that video sharing site Veoh is a “service provider” within the scope of that 
definition.82  Nonetheless, UMG claimed that Veoh was not “innocent” with 
respect to copyright infringement because the UGC did not meet the requirements 
set forth in § 512(c) and (i) of the Act.83 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998) (“Subsection (a) applies to service providers transmitting, 
routing, or providing connections for material, and some forms of intermediate and transient storage of 
material in the course of performing these functions.”); see also id. at 52 (“Subsection (b)(1) provides 
that the material must be transmitted to subsequent users without modification to its content.”). 
 75. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 48, § 12B.04[A][2][b] (suggesting that DMCA safe 
harbors only exclude from immunity a limited set of vicarious liability cases of “direct financial 
benefit,” narrower than the common law scope of vicarious liability, which includes indirect benefits); 
Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233, 233–69 (2009) 
(commenting on the ongoing uncertainty over DMCA safe harbors and suggesting guiding principles to 
clarify and update them); Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have Legal Problems, SLATE (Oct. 26, 2006, 
4:28 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2152264/ (noting that YouTube is protected by a notice-and-
takedown system, but that YouTube’s legal status “might not be 100-percent airtight”). 
 76. Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats:  Reckoning the Future 
Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 593 (2008). 
 77. Id. at 594, n.70 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53). 
 78. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 64. 
 79. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Brief of 
Amici in Support of Verizon’s Opposition to RIAA’s Motion to Enforce at 6, In re Verizon, 240 F. 
Supp. 2d 24 (No. CIV.A.02-MS-0323(JDB)), 2002 WL 32387949), rev’d sub nom. Recording Indus. 
Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 80. Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 593. 
 81. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Corbis 
Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
 82. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 83. Id. (citing ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating 
that “immunity . . . [is] granted only to ‘innocent’ service providers”)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (i) 
(2006); Viacom Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 33, at 56. 
GALLO - FINAL 2/28/2011  5:59:34 PM 
294 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:2 
 
These sections direct service providers to “remove, or disable access to, the 
material that is claimed to be infringing,” to adopt and implement a policy that 
appropriately terminates the subscriptions of “repeat infringers,” and to 
“accommodate and . . . not interfere with standard technical measures.”84  The 
extent to which Web 2.0 services have successfully complied with these affirmative 
obligations is the subject of ongoing debate.85  In general, UGCs comply with the 
specific notice-and-takedown process detailed in § 512(c).86  However, the repeat 
infringer and standard technical measure requirements in § 512(i) have yet to be 
conclusively defined, perpetuating the uncertainty of whether UGCs can (or do) 
comply with the DMCA safe harbor prerequisites.87 
C.  THE UGC PRINCIPLES 
In 1997, a group of major commercial copyright owners and web services 
providing user-uploaded audio and visual content collaborated to establish 
“Principles for User Generated Content Services.”88  These principles were 
intended to “foster an online environment that promotes the promises and benefits 
of UGC Services and protects the rights of Copyright Owners.”89  In particular, 
many of the principles are intended to shift the burden of policing infringement 
from the Copyright Owners alone to be shared with the UGCs.90  The Principles 
take the DMCA safe harbor requirements as their starting point, incorporating 
requirements such as a “good faith belief” in infringement on the part of copyright 
owners and “expeditious” removal of allegedly infringing content.91  A substantial 
portion of this agreement also calls for the use of “effective content identification 
technology,” that is “highly effective . . . in achieving the goal of eliminating 
infringing content.”92  Though this technology is not specifically identified, the 
Principles provide a detailed description of how this technology should function to 
filter out potentially infringing content before the fact.93 
Initially, the copyright owners must provide UGC sites with “Reference 
 84. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C), (i)(1)(A)–(B). 
 85. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Veoh, 
665 F. Supp. 2d 1099. 
 86. See sources cited supra Part I.B. 
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A)–(B). 
 88. UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55.  The initial signatories include the major television studios 
(CBS, Disney, Fox, NBC-Universal and Viacom), and some UGC sites (Myspace, Veoh, Daily Motion 
and SoapBox).  Id.  Google (YouTube) is notably absent.  Id.  See also Alan N. Braverman & Terri 
Southwick, The User-Generated Content Principles:  The Motivation, Process, Results and Lessons 
Learned, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 471–80 (2009) (noting that “[t]he hope behind the Principles was 
that if the rhetoric could be reduced and trust could be built (however slowly), rights owners and UGC 
platforms should be able to find a shared interest in forging a workable solution”). 
 89. UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 90. Braverman & Southwick, supra note 88. 
 91. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), (c)(1)(C).  For example, under Principle 8, participating UGCs 
agreed to facilitate the notice and takedown process by expeditiously removing content.  UGC 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 55, ¶ 8. 
 92. UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55, ¶ 3. 
 93. Id. 
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Material,” which should include the data required to establish a match between the 
copyrighted work and user-uploaded content, instructions regarding how those 
matches should be treated and a representation of the owner’s authority to exercise 
rights with respect to those works.94  This system depends on copyright owners 
creating digital “fingerprints” of their audio and visual works, which can then be 
used to target matches or infringing copies online.95  UGCs are essentially required 
to participate in this matching process by using the reference material to “filter” or 
scan user-uploaded content before that content is made available on its service.96  
The Principles accept as their underlying objectives the legitimate interests in “(1) 
blocking infringing user-uploaded content, (2) allowing wholly original and 
authorized uploads, and (3) accommodating fair use.”97  With particular attention 
to the first of these objectives, the Principles provide that the default treatment of 
content matches should be to block, rather than to allow, notify or license 
potentially infringing content.98  Though not enforceable obligations, the Principles 
provided an informal deadline for UGCs to implement technology by the end of 
2007.99 
These principles merely represent an unenforceable agreement based on best 
practice and the leading UGC site, YouTube.com, did not sign on.  Nevertheless, 
all major right holders and all major UGCs, including YouTube and other 
nonsigners like GoFish and Break.com, employ some form of the fingerprinting 
technology proposed by the UGC Principles.100  On its face, the extent to which 
this filtering scheme meets the three-prong definition of “standard technical 
measures” seems clear.  Still, parties dispute the application and effectiveness of 
fingerprinting technology, obscuring its satisfaction of a “broad consensus.”101 
 94. Id. ¶ 3(a).  Note that “reference material” may include watermarks, but not necessarily.  See 
supra note 16; see also Bill Rosenblatt, Video Content Owners and User Generated Content Sites Agree 
on Filtering Principles, DRM WATCH (Oct. 25, 2007), http://www.drmwatch.com 
/watermarking/article.php/3707261 (“Content owners agree to provide information to UGC sites that 
enables them to use the technology—such as watermarks, or copies of content for fingerprinting 
purposes.” (emphasis added)).  However, major UGCs party to the Principles, such as Veoh, do not 
implement this more sophisticated (and burdensome and expensive) technology.  See, e.g., Solveig 
Singleton, Veoh Wins Copyright Infringement Case, DRM WATCH (Sept. 11, 2008), 
http://www.drmwatch.com/legal/article.php/3771041 (“The ruling that equates ‘control’ with 
prescreening ability is likely to prove more difficult . . . . [D]oes it simply put more pressure on the 
content side to step up with technology such as watermarking that would enable such control?”). 
 95. UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55, ¶ 3(a)–(i). 
 96. Id. 
 97. UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55, ¶ 3(d), (f). 
 98. Id. ¶ (3)(a). 
 99. Id. ¶ 3. 
 100. GoFish.com provides online games, created and rated by users.  GOFISH, http://gofish.com/ 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2010).  Break.com provides humorous online videos and video clips, which can be 
uploaded and ranked by users. BREAK, http://www.break.com/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2010); see also Press 
Release:  Audible Magic Licenses Digital Filtering Technology to Break.com, AUDIBLE MAGIC (Mar. 
15, 2007), http://www.audiblemagic.com/news/press-releases/pr-2007-03-15.asp; Press Release:  
GoFish Partners with Audible Magic, AUDIBLE MAGIC (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.audiblemagic.com/ 
news/press-releases/pr-2007-03-07.asp.. 
 101. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A) (2006). 
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D.  TECHNOLOGY USED IN PRACTICE 
Fingerprinting measures satisfy the UGC Principles, but do not meet 
unreasonably high right holder expectations.  Right holders such as Universal 
Music Group (UMG) employ the same technology themselves and furthermore 
deem the technology sufficient to identify infringers and implement aggressive 
repeat infringer policies.102  Nevertheless, right holders are dissatisfied with the 
current application of fingerprinting technology.103  But despite their hold-out 
posture, and despite YouTube’s absence from the UGC Principles, parties on both 
ends of the digital infringement dilemma, including YouTube, rely on 
fingerprinting technology to regulate infringement.  Absent more specific 
instructions about the terms of the “open, fair, and voluntary” agreement necessary 
to establish “standard technical measures,” widespread fingerprinting technology 
should satisfy the term.104 
Despite proprietary variations, fingerprinting technology is widespread among 
UGCs.105  Even YouTube, the most notable absentee from the Principles 
agreement, takes proactive steps to prevent copyright infringement with 
fingerprinting technology.106  A party’s particular protocol with respect to its 
fingerprinting identification is not publicly available information.  For instance, 
whether a given right holder or UGC decides to block, tag or do nothing when its 
program turns up is a matter of “best practice,” which varies according to a party’s 
operating system and according to the quality or type of match.107  However, the 
general framework and operability of these programs can be readily understood. 
YouTube describes its ContentID system as “an advanced set of copyright 
policies and content management tools to give rights holders control of their 
content.”108  This system has two different methods of operation: the Content 
Verification Program and Audio ID and Video ID.109  The Verification Program 
tool “assists copyright owners in searching for material that they believe to be 
infringing, and provid[es] YouTube with information reasonably sufficient to . . . 
locate that material.”110  Audio ID and Video ID, by comparison, include more 
technologically sophisticated protection mechanisms.111  They operate by 
comparing uploaded YouTube videos against reference files provided by content 
 102. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 
2009). 
 103. Id. at 1103 n.6. 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A). 
 105. See, e.g., UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 106. Content Management Overview, supra note 5. 
 107. Telephone Interview with Stanley Pierre-Louis, Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel for 
Intellectual Prop., Viacom Inc. (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Viacom Interview]. 
 108. Audio ID and Video ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Oct. 21, 
2010). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Content Verification Program, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/copyright_program (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 111. Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 108. 
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owners.112  This comparison process can identify user-uploaded videos comprised 
entirely or partially of copyrighted content.113  Once a match occurs, YouTube then 
implements one of three treatments, depending on the right holder’s instruction: 
“monetize, track, or block.”114  The inner workings of YouTube’s identification 
technology are not publicized, and are unlikely to be revealed, now that Judge 
Stanton has denied Viacom’s motions to compel production of that and similar 
information.115  But at face value, it appears that YouTube is employing a device 
functionally identical to those preferred by the UGC Principles and adopted 
throughout the industry.  Furthermore, many prominent cyber-copyright scholars 
and practitioners argue that these devices may even go too far.116 
A recent decision of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
describes several technological methods that the UGC site Veoh (a party to the 
UGC Principles) utilizes to prevent copyright infringement.117  For example, since 
2006, Veoh has used “hash filtering” software that “automatically disables access 
to any identical video and blocks any subsequently submitted duplicates.”118  In 
addition, since October 2007, Veoh has adopted a third party device from a 
company called “Audible Magic.”119  As understood by the court, “Audible 
Magic’s product works by taking an audio ‘fingerprint’ from video files and 
comparing it to a database of copyrighted content that is provided by content 
holders.”120  The company’s website describes the process, enabled by their 
“Patented CopySense” identification techniques, as “highly immune to 
compression or distortion, and . . . indifferent to codec, file type or streaming 
format.”121  These capabilities are particularly well suited to detect digital files.  
MP3 files remove imperceptible bits of information, altering the binary encoding of 
audio files without affecting their sound, in order to store and convey those files in 
condensed formats.122  Digital video files can assume various file types, such as 
.avi, .mov and .flv, requiring a technological device that can detect content matches 
in a variety of formats.123  Audible Magic is arguably the industry leader for digital 
fingerprinting, maintaining a content registry of over six million works.124  This 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Content Management Overview, supra note 5. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc. 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 116. Richard Koman, EFF’s von Lohmann:  YouTube Worse Than DMCA for Fair Use, ZDNET 
(Apr. 7, 2009), http://government.zdnet.com/?p=4570 (“Under the current process, we make YouTube 
aware of WMG content.  Their content ID tool then takes down all unlicensed tracks, regardless of how 
they are used.” (quoting Will Tanous, Warner Music Grp. Spokesperson)). 
 117. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1103. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Content Identification Services, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/products-
services/contentsvcs (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 122. How MP3 Files Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://howstuffworks.com/mp31.htm (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2010). 
 123. Video File Types, FILEINFO.COM, http://www.fileinfo.com/filetypes/video (last visited Dec. 1, 
2010). 
 124. Content Identification Services, supra note 121. 
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database, along with others, supplies a bulk of the reference material, which Veoh 
and other file-sharing sites use to compare against their user-uploaded files.125 
This fingerprinting filtering process, anticipated by the UGC Principles 
described above, has become an industry standard among both copyright holders 
and UGC sites.126  For example, major right holder Viacom employs a similar 
company, Auditude, among others, to imprint its own copyrighted works and 
search for infringing matches.127  Similar to Audible Magic, Auditude’s Content ID 
indexing system claims to “fingerprint[] over 100 channels of TV every second 
every day and applies the right metadata (show name, episode, air date, etc),” at 
speeds “thirty to 300 times faster than the rest of the industry.”128  According to 
Sean Varah, CEO of MotionDSP, yet another company producing fingerprinting 
software, the technology is capable of performing algorithmic matches down to 
thirty seconds for audio and video content.129  In other words, the technology can 
identify a thirty-second clip of a two-hour movie or a thirty-second clip from a 
four-minute song.130  The matches are essentially binary, although Viacom 
describes its matching process on a scoring basis from one to one hundred, such 
that only matches above a certain score will be deemed positive matches.131  The 
program analyzes online audio and video data against a library of copyrighted 
content and then determines a match by comparing variations in color composition, 
light, volume, pitch, etc.  So, a match of fifty or even seventy-five may not 
constitute an infringing “match,” but one over ninety, or ninety-five, probably 
would.132  Once a match is made according to its individual standard, a company 
then determines treatment instructions based on its best practice—which is not 
publicly available information and varies from company to company—and then 
either blocks, tags or does nothing with the matched, and possibly infringing, 
content.133 
These mechanisms facially comply with the “content identification technology” 
practices described by the UGC Principles.134  However, UMG, Viacom and other 
right holders insist that these mechanisms, including their own, are insufficient as 
 125. Press Release:  Dailymotion Selects Audible Magic’s Fingerprinting Solution for Detecting 
Copyrighted Video, AUDIBLE MAGIC (May 10, 2007), http://www.audiblemagic.com/news/press-
releases/pr-2007-05-10.asp; Press Release:  Microsoft Selects Audible Magic’s Digital Fingerprinting 
Technology as Filtering Solution for Soapbox Video Site, AUDIBLE MAGIC (Mar. 26, 2007), 
http://www.audiblemagic.com/news/press-releases/pr-2007-03-26.asp. 
 126. See supra Part I.A.  See also UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 127. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 260 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting 
Housley Decl. ¶ 2). 
 128. Products, AUDITUDE, http://www.auditude.com/products (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).  In 
contrast, Audible Magic’s technology does not use metadata. 
 129. E-mail from Sean Varah, CEO & Founder, MotionDSP, to author (Nov. 23, 2009, 03:06 EST) 
(on file with author). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Viacom Interview, supra note 107. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.; see also Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 108. 
 134. UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55, ¶ 3. 
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currently employed by UGCs.135  Despite removing the “vast majority” of 
identified copyrighted works, the District Court for the Central District of 
California found that Veoh’s efforts were incomplete: “[E]ven the Audible Magic 
filter had failed to identify as infringing hundreds of these allegedly infringing 
videos.”136  Arguably, because of this general dissatisfaction, fingerprinting 
technology, by definition, cannot meet the broad consensus for “standard technical 
measures” required by the DMCA.137  On the other hand, Congress may not have 
intended unanimity or even near unanimity to qualify as a “broad consensus.”  In 
light of the controversies prompting the passage of § 512, it is unlikely that 
Congress intended to create such a large obstacle in the way of satisfying the safe 
harbor condition.  Because many right holders and UGC sites have already 
accepted, if not formally agreed to, the use of fingerprinting technology, it is 
currently the best candidate for fulfilling the terms of the statutory provision. 
Relatedly, UMG contends that Audible Magic’s matching system should be 
used to implement the second prong of § 512(i)’s eligibility requirement:  the 
repeat infringer policy.138  Though the filtering system is not 100 percent effective 
at identifying its fingerprinted works, UMG reasons that its identifications should 
nonetheless form a sufficient basis for terminating users.139  The right holder 
expects that users whose content is matched through fingerprinting technology 
should be automatically blocked from accessing the UGC in the future, even 
though the right holder considers the same technology ineffective in the context of 
automatically removing infringing content.140  The District Court for the Central 
District of California disagreed:  “[H]owever beneficial the Audible Magic 
technology is in helping to identify infringing material,” the court reasoned, “it 
does not meet the standard of reliability and verifiability required . . . to justify 
terminating a user’s account.”141 
The court extended the knowledge standard of § 512(c)(1)(A)—good faith—to 
repeat infringer termination policies.142  Thus, the technical measures enabled by 
Audible Magic, Auditude and MotionDSP “cannot be a valid basis” for terminating 
a user because the UGC site “has no way of verifying the accuracy of Audible 
Magic’s database, and even if it did, it would be unreasonable to place that burden 
on [the UGC site].”143  In other words, in order to allege a good faith belief in 
infringement, whether on the part of the right holder demanding takedown or on the 
part of the UGC site terminating repeat infringers, the party must perform some 
minimal human review and cannot rely solely on technological detection.144 
 135. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 
2009); Viacom Complaint 1, supra note 44. 
 136. Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. 
 137. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2006). 
 138. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
 139. Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1117–18 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 143. Id. at 1118. 
 144. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The DMCA 
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This case upheld second-warning termination policies conditional on sworn 
declarations of good-faith belief in infringement.145  The court broadened the level 
of knowledge required for legal action under subsection (c)—“good faith belief”—
to encompass subsection (i)—“Conditions for Eligibility.”146   
Though it does not say so explicitly, this holding also sheds light on the 
“standard technical measures” requirement.  First, the court implicitly upheld the 
Audible Magic filtering process as applied to the vicarious liability described in § 
512(c)(1)(B).147  Second, the court indicated that other, more precise, subsections 
of § 512 can be extended to interpret the more opaque requirements in 512(i).148  
Although the court did not agree that fingerprinting technology, without more, 
could authorize a repeat infringer termination, its decision underscores the 
dissension between UGCs and right holders regarding “standard technical 
measures.”  Affected parties universally implement filtering technology as the 
principal measure for identifying infringing content, but none can reconcile that 
technology with the statutory requirements of § 512(i).149 
III.  DEFINING “STANDARD TECHNICAL MEASURES”:  THE INTENT 
AND THE TECHNOLOGY 
Despite the relatively lengthy statutory definition of the term, the phrase 
“standard technical measures” has yet to attach to any existing technology.  
Nevertheless, the text hints at the sort of measures the drafters had in mind.150  The 
three requisite characteristics—broad consensus, availability and low cost—evoke 
standards development organizations (SDOs), such as the DVD Copy Control 
Association (DVD CCA), which have been successful in other areas of legal 
development.151  Indeed, the legislative history even anticipates that standard 
technical measures “could be developed both in recognized open standards bodies 
or in ad hoc groups,” provided the process is consistent with that prescribed by § 
512(i)(2)(A).152   
However, ten years after passage, no SDOs have emerged to resolve the 
definition.  Nor have the courts been any help.  Interpreting § 1201, the United 
already requires copyright owners to make an initial review of the potentially infringing material . . . 
indeed it would be impossible to meet any of the requirements of Section 512(c) without doing so.”);  
see also, Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003–05 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(grounding its decision on the minimal review that MPAA agents did employ, although not reaching the 
issue of human review because MPAA employees reviewed the site); Viacom Interview, supra note 107 
(indicating that Viacom reviews allegedly infringing material before issuing takedown notices). 
 145. Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1117–18. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1113. 
 148. Id. at 1117–18. 
 149. See supra Part I.A. 
 150. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2) (2006). 
 151. See id.; see also, e.g., All Standards and Drafts, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (W3C), 
http://www.w3.org/TR (last visited Dec. 1, 2010) (naming Hypertext Transfer Protocol, Hypertext 
Markup Language and the World Wide Web as examples of successful SDOs). 
 152. S.  REP.  NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998) (noting also:  “A number of recognized open standards 
bodies have substantial experience with Internet issues.”). 
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated in dicta that the 
Robots Exclusion Protocol (robots.txt) could possibly qualify as a “standard 
technical measure,” though it was probably not intentionally developed “to identify 
or protect” copyrighted works.153  Automated Content Access Protocol (ACAP) is 
currently being developed to supplement robots.txt with the express purpose of 
controlling content use and display and thus expressly meeting the statutory 
requirement “to identify and protect” copyrighted works.154  However, ACAP’s 
ability to garner a “broad consensus” is doubtful because it would impose an 
exceedingly high burden on UGCs and other site hosts to limit the length, type and 
display settings for user-uploaded and -generated content, compromising their 
services’ appeal and operability.155  Given the inactivity by SDOs and the courts 
and the obstacles to the adoption of potentially qualifying robots.txt and ACAP, 
already-adopted fingerprinting technology may be the best candidate to meet the 
statutory definition. 
Part A of this section will parse the statutory definition by examining the 
legislative history underlying § 512 and the DMCA generally.  Part B will then take 
a closer look at SDOS, which Congress expected to be the source of reconciling the 
statutory definition.  Finally, Part C will introduce a variety of possible “standard 
technical measures” considered by the courts to meet the terms of § 512.156  While 
these legislative intentions and judicial developments help to illustrate a prediction 
of what “standard technical measures” should or might have once looked like, all 
fall short of establishing an appropriate solution. 
A.  CLUES FOR INTERPRETING § 512(i)(2):  THE WHOLE ACT AND THE TEXT 
The DMCA, through its notice-and-takedown regime, unmistakably places the 
burden on right holders to police their own content.157  Furthermore, UGC 
technology does not currently support a business model that includes substantial 
effort at policing infringement by their users.  With its passage, § 512 took into 
account the automated nature of providing many online services, the likelihood of 
technology to solve copyright problems posed by technology and the probability 
that standards development organizations would be the source of that technical 
solution.158  These considerations are evident in both the language and structure of 
 153. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2); Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 643 (E.D. 
Pa. 2007). 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B); Gavin O’Reilly, Solutions to Address the Challenges of 
Communicating Digital Rights and Permissions, ACAP:  MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK ON THE WEB, 
http://www.the-acap.org/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
 155. See Ryan Paul, A Skeptical Look at the Automated Content Access Protocol, ARS TECHNICA 
(Jan. 13, 2008, 11:58 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2008/01/skeptical-look-at-acap.ars 
[hereinafter ACAP Ars Technica]; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(C) (requiring that standard technical 
measures “not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or 
networks.” (emphasis added)). 
 156. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B). 
 157. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 
512(m). 
 158. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998). 
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the Act itself, which allocates primary responsibility for policing content on the 
party with the greatest interest in protecting copyrighted work:  the right holders 
themselves. 
Apart from their affirmative duty to comply with the takedown requests issued 
by right holders, UGCs are also responsible, under § 512(i)(1) for 
“accommodat[ing] and . . . not interfer[ing] with standard technical measures.”159  
This language implies that UGCs are not obligated to implement such measures 
independently, but only that they must “accommodate” them.160  Based on its plain 
meaning, this provision can be interpreted to require that UGCs passively tolerate 
or become compatible with standard technical measures.161  For example, UGCs 
might be compelled to allow right holders access to their sites to independently 
police infringement, but not to perform any affirmative obligation beyond 
responding to resulting takedown notices.162  As it stands, this is already more than 
some UGCs have agreed to.163   
Under a more exacting interpretation, the provision may require that UGCs 
actively employ protective measures similar or identical to those employed by right 
holders on behalf of their copyrights.  At least one canon of judicial 
interpretation—avoidance of redundancy—supports the premise that subsection (i) 
requires something different from or additional to the previous subsections, which 
allow service providers to sit and wait for right holders to issue takedown 
notices.164   
However, the countervailing canons of statutory interpretation, coupled with 
existing practice, probably favor a more passive approach to compliance with § 
512(i)(2).  Under noscitur a sociis, for example, “accommodate” would mean “not 
interfere with,” and thus support a passive reading of noninterference.165  The 
Whole Act Rule lends support to this approach, given that the DMCA was 
constructed to limit liability of service providers through passive obligations, and in 
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).  UGC sites also cannot receive direct financial benefit attributable 
to infringing activity, and must adopt and reasonably implement a repeat infringer policy.  17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(1)(B), (i)(1)(A). 
 160. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).  The explicit language in § 512(i)(2), which specifies “standard 
technical measures means technical measures that are used by copyright owners,” affirms that this 
requirement is not proactive.  17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2) (emphasis added). 
 161. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 11 (4th ed. 2006) 
(defining “accommodate” as “to make suitable or consistent; adapt;” also, “to have or make room for”). 
 162. By allowing right holders access to identify and locate infringing content, UGCs would 
simply enable § 512(c) procedure to be consistent with standard open access Internet protocol.  17 
U.S.C. § 512(c); see also id. § 512(m) (clarifying that service providers have no duty to monitor or 
affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard 
technical measure complying with the provisions of subsection (i)).  At present, because no standard 
technical measures have been established, this could be simplified to relieve service providers of any 
duty to monitor or affirmatively seek infringing activity beyond the requirements in § 512(c). 
 163. See Viacom Complaint 1, supra note 44 (alleging that user privacy settings prevent them from 
effectively identifying infringing content). 
 164. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001). 
 165. Noscitur a sociis translates as “by which words are known by their companions.”  See, e.g., 
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115. 
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light of the limiting language in the Protection of Privacy provision in § 512(m).166 
The text of § 512(i) also provides a definition of the term “standard technical 
measures,” but this definition has caused more obstacles than clarifications.167  
Subsections (B) and (C) mandate realistic cost and widespread access: 
straightforward counterparts to the broad consensus requirement of (A).168  
However, in light of the adversarial relationship between service providers and 
right holders, the broad consensus provision is worrisome.   
Though a large section of the industry has arguably demonstrated its willingness 
and ability to work together in an “open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards 
process,” at least in the informal context of the developing the UGC Principles, any 
broader or legally enforceable collaboration appears at present to be nearly 
impossible to achieve.169  Right holders and UGCs have unmistakably competing 
interests: the former to protect copyright and the latter to attract web traffic, 
including by reproducing and displaying popular, sometimes copyrighted works.  
Furthermore, the nature of UGC technology, by which the sites provide and 
organize a platform for user-uploaded material, does not currently support a 
business model that includes substantial effort at policing infringement.170  And the 
DMCA endorses this inactivity, at least to some degree. 
The Act specifies in § 512 (m) that a service provider has no duty to monitor or 
“affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent 
consistent with a standard technical measure complying with the provisions of 
subsection (i).”171  This limitation is consistent with the underlying purpose of the 
Act: to enable routine service activities without risking liability and without any 
obligation to routinely track user activities that may constitute copyright 
infringement.172  The Ninth Circuit asserted this principle succinctly:  “[t]he 
DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright 
 166. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see, e.g., 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (“[U]pon notification of claimed infringement . . . [the service provider] responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing.” (emphasis 
added)); Id. § 512(m) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of 
subsections (a) through (d) on . . . a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts 
indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure 
complying with the provisions of subsection (i).”). 
 167. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). 
 168. Id. § 512(i)(2)(B), (i)(2)(C), (i)(2)(A).  Common sense suggests that any technology 
developed in an “open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process” would more likely than not be 
reasonably available and would not impose substantial costs or burdens. These subsections are probably 
meant to ensure that the “broad consensus” should not be limited to industry leaders, but should include 
input from startup, independent and nonprofit interests as well. 
 169. See, e.g., UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 170. Indeed, one could characterize the current fingerprinting technology employed by UGCs as 
more of a quick fix than a viable solution. See, e.g., Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback:  
User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 395 (2009) 
(“Because it is an automated system, it will capture fair use as well as infringement.”). 
 171. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (emphasis added). 
 172. See supra Part I.B.  Neither can service providers be “aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).  The courts have interpreted this 
“apparent” standard as a very high threshold or “red flag” standard.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 
F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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infringement . . . squarely on the owners of the copyright.”173  This distribution of 
responsibility supports interpreting the requirement that service providers 
“accommodate” standard technical measures concurrently with the “complying” 
language in this subsection.  Service providers are therefore probably not obligated 
to monitor user activity by independently supplying technical measures, but should 
once again oblige and assist the policing goals of right holders through technical 
measures.  This textual interpretation sheds light on what “standard technical 
measures” might look like by excluding the possibility of a device that would place 
the responsibility for copyright control entirely in the hands of the UGCs. 
On a broader scale, Professor Sonia K. Katyal notes that the phrase “standard 
technical measures” is “notoriously difficult to define in the wake of changing 
norms of technology and surveillance.”174  Rapid technological development 
disturbs the very notion of “standard,” which, combined with competing interests in 
policing enforcement and protecting privacy, has significantly encumbered the 
process of development.  Sites are simultaneously under attack for compromising 
user privacy, while fielding demands that they keep track of user activity to better 
monitor for infringement.175  And, for better or worse, this dilemma does not 
appear to have been anticipated by the enacting legislature. 
In its report on the passage of the DMCA, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
asserted that technology would solve the problems facing copyright holders and 
service providers.176  The report indicates that the “standard technical measures” 
provision was “intended to encourage appropriate technological solutions to protect 
copyrighted works.”177  Given the now thirteen-year delay, the Committee foresaw 
that such a collaborative agreement would be unlikely without legislative 
backing.178  However, the legislature did propose one solution, speculating that 
“these provisions could be developed . . . in recognized open standards bodies,” in 
light of the success of those groups in other realms.179 
B.  LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE HOPE FOR STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Open standards bodies, or “Standards Development Organizations,” have 
considerable experience with developing Internet and digital legal management 
issues.180  According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU-T), a 
 173. CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1113. 
 174. Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 275 (2005). 
 175. See, e.g., Ryan Paul, Epic Fail:  Google Faces FTC Complaint over Buzz Privacy, ARS 
TECHNICA (Feb. 17, 2010, 8:12 AM), http://www.arstechnica.com/security/news/2010/02/epic-fail-
google-faces-complaint-over-buzz-privacy-issues.ars; Viacom Complaint 1, supra note 44. 
 176. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (“The Committee strongly urges all of the affected parties expeditiously to commence 
voluntary, interindustry discussions to agree upon and implement the best technological solutions 
available to achieve these goals.”). 
 179. See UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 180. S.  REP.  NO. 105-190, at 52. 
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specialized agency of the United Nations, “Open Standards” are “standards made 
available to the general public and . . . developed (or approved) and maintained via 
a collaborative and consensus driven process” to “facilitate interoperability and 
data exchange among different products or services and . . . intended for 
widespread adoption.”181  One of the best known examples of this open standards 
development is the Content Scramble System (CSS), developed by the DVD Copy 
Control Association (DVD CCA).182  According to some, the DVD CCA offers the 
best model for developing “standard technical measures” consistent with the 
statutory definition.183 
In 2003, Professor Pamela Samuelson proposed an open standards solution 
similar to the DVD CCA in response to proposed additional legislative 
encouragement to produce “standard technical measures.”184  The motion picture 
industry and other groups of copyright owners collaborated to encourage members 
of Congress to introduce the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television 
Promotion Act (CBDTPA).185  According to Samuelson, the Act “would give 
representatives of technology companies, copyright holders, and consumer groups 
12 months to agree on such ‘standard technical measures,’” and would further 
require FCC rulemaking to require embedding in “every digital media device,” 
arguably including even “general-purpose computers.”186  Samuelson suggests that 
this legislation would overly tax existing technological freedoms and discusses a 
better alternative, already anticipated by § 512(i): 
Universal adoption of standard technical protection measures could also come through 
standards-setting by industry groups.  This would have virtually the same effect in the 
marketplace as a legislative mandate, but happen without input from consumers.  For 
instance, the motion picture and consumer electronics industries reached agreement in 
1995 on the content scramble system (CSS) as a standard technical protection measure 
for DVD discs and players.187 
The DVD CCA describes itself as a “not-for-profit corporation with 
responsibility for licensing CSS . . . to manufacturers of DVD hardware, discs and 
related products.”188  The corporation was formed pursuant to authority granted by 
the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, which was 
designed to clarify the application of antitrust laws and provide shelter to standards 
 181. Definition of Open Standards, ITU-T, http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/othergroups/ipr-
adhoc/openstandards.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). 
 182. Content Scramble System (CSS), DVD COPY CONTROL ASS’N, http://www.dvdcca.org/css/ 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
 183. Pamela Samuelson, The Congressional Corral:  The Future of Digital Technology Is in the 
Hands of the U.S. Congress, IEEE SPECTRUM, May 2003, at 33, 33–34. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Declan McCullagh, Anti-Copy Bill Slams Coders, WIRED (Mar. 22, 2002), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/ news/2002/03/51274. 
 186. Samuelson, supra note 183, at 33. 
 187. Id. at 34. 
 188. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), DVD COPY CONTROL ASS’N, http://www.dvdcca.org/ 
faq.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). 
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development organizations that follow NCRP procedures.189  The DVD CCA 
notice provides that “[t]he nature and objectives of the venture are to provide an 
encryption technology designed to prevent unlawful or unauthorized copying by 
encrypting digital files.”190  The cited consensus includes an expansive group of 
International media companies, including Intel Corporation, LG Electronics and 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, and since has been widely accepted as the standard 
technical measure for protecting copyrighted works.191 
Support for the view that Congress had CSS-type “standard technical measures” 
in mind may also be found in the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, 
already referenced in the context of robots.txt approval.192  In § 1201(a)(3), the 
statute provides illustrative examples of what “technological measure[s] that 
effectively control[] access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act]” would 
look like.193  The subsection includes measures such as “scrambling, encrypting . . . 
 189. The National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 was subsequently amended 
by the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, sec. 103, § 2 , Pub. L. No. 108-
237, 118 Stat. 661, 663 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (2006)).  The amendment defined “standards 
development organization” as: 
a domestic or international organization that plans, develops, establishes, or coordinates 
voluntary consensus standards using procedures that incorporate the attributes of openness, 
balance of interests,due process, an appeals process, and consensus in a manner consistent with 
the Office of Management and Budget Circular Number A-119, as revised February 10, 1998. 
Id. 
 190. Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 40,727-01 (Aug. 3, 2001). 
 191. Id.  DeCSS circumvention technology has undermined the effectiveness of CSS, and its 
legality in light of 17 U.S.C. § 1201 remains subject to debate.  See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that Congress can legitimately regulate the 
“functionality” of DeCSS code).  But see DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 
(Ct. App. 2002) (holding that DeCSS is “pure speech” that must not be subjected to prior restraint under 
the trade secret laws), rev’d, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003), remanded to, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(ruling that the preliminary injunction was not warranted on the grounds that there was no evidence that 
the Content Scrambling System (CSS) encryption technology used in DVD movie disks was still a trade 
secret by the time that Bunner posted DeCSS code on his website, so the preliminary injunction was an 
unconstitutional restriction on his right to free speech).  See also ROBERT S. THAU & BRYAN TAYLOR, 
“AUTHORITY OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNER” IN 1201(A), AND FIRST SALE 13 (Aug. 4, 2000), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/occ/dmca2000/ThauTaylor.pdf. 
 192. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  Like § 512(c), the anticircumvention provision in 
§ 1201 has been hotly contested and hotly litigated.   17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).  Generally, this provision 
prohibits breaking or bypassing technical measures in place to protect copyrighted works.  Id.  However, 
§ 1201(a) and (b) vary in scope, the former dealing with both circumventing and trafficking in 
circumvention tools related to accessing copyrighted works, the latter dealing only with trafficking of 
circumvention tools related to copying works already accessed.  Id. § 1201(a), (b).  The scope of § 
1201(a) has met challenges as it impliedly extends the scope of copyright to include the right to control 
access to copyrighted works.  See, e.g., 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. 
Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D.Cal. 2004).  On the other hand, § 1201(c) explicitly provides that nothing in § 1201 
“shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use.”  Id. 
§ 1201(c).  The Federal and Second Circuits have split in their various interpretations to this section.  
Compare Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004), with Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).  See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 193. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
GALLO - FINAL 2/28/2011  5:59:34 PM 
2011] “STANDARD TECHNICAL MEASURES” FOR UGC WEBSITES 307 
 
[or] treatment such as password protection.”194  Such measures include CSS, 
fingerprinting, robots.txt and other web-crawling protocols:  all candidates to hold 
the title of “standard technical measures.”  Although the anticircumvention 
provisions are clearly separate from the liability limitations of § 512, the 
simultaneous passage of these sections may shed further light on what Congress 
had in mind when it provided for “standard technical measures” in both sections. 
As demonstrated by this and other successful applications of standard 
development groups, the kind of standard setting envisioned by § 512(i)(2)(A) is 
feasible despite the adversarial relationship between interested parties.  And, if 
achieved in a manner that does not require significant affirmative obligations on the 
part of UGCs, it would both satisfy the Protection of Privacy requirement in § 
512(m) and not overly burden any of the participating parties.  The CBDTPA’s 
FCC rulemaking proposal is unlikely to pass consistently with the DMCA, given 
the DMCA’s requirement that standard technical measures be developed in an 
“open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process.”195  Yet, this proposal 
serves as an indication that these measures are forthcoming, and that interested 
parties, at least on one side of the spectrum, are eager for their development and 
establishment.  Until then, the courts have characterized, or come close to 
characterizing, some technologies as “standard technical measures.”196  However, 
as discussed below, these are unlikely to garner widespread acceptance by right 
holders and service providers in satisfaction of the statute. 
C.  POTENTIALLY QUALIFYING “STANDARD TECHNICAL MEASURES” 
ACCORDING TO THE COURTS 
The robots exclusion standard (robots.txt) is the only arguably qualifying 
“standard technical measure” identified by the judiciary.197  Consistent with the 
statutory definition, the system was initially devised through an open collaborative 
effort in 1994, and is regarded as the “de-facto standard” for Web publishers to 
“control the way search engines access and display their content.”198  Leading 
 194. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
 195. Id. § 512(i)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 196. See infra Part III.C. 
 197. In Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. Pa. 2007), the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered whether the Robots Exclusion Protocol 
(robots.txt) satisfied the statutory requirement.  Healthcare Advocates placed a robots.txt file on its 
website “as a means of preventing the public from accessing archived screenshots of [the company’s 
website].”  Id. at 631.  The plaintiff characterized this file use as a “digital padlock,” to which only 
defendant’s personnel had the key, such that another’s access would be infringing under 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(a)(1)(A).  Id. at 632.  The court agreed, reasoning that because a robots.txt file worked to block 
access to copyrighted images, and because only the website owner could remove the file, it “qualifies as 
a technological measure effectively controlling access to the archived copyrighted images.”  Id. at 643.  
In this limited scenario, interpreting another provision of the DMCA, which also anticipates “standard 
technical measures,” the court definitively characterized robots.txt as such.  Id.  Still, the court specified 
that its holding “should not be interpreted as a finding that a robots.txt file universally qualifies” as a 
standard technical measure.  Id. 
 198. ACAP Ars Technica, supra note 155; A Standard for Robot Exclusion, WEB ROBOTS PAGES, 
http://www.robotstxt.org/orig.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2010) (noting that the standards “represent[] a 
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search engines run by Microsoft, Yahoo and Google all implement robots.txt in 
some form.199  Site operators use robots.txt to guide and instruct Web crawling 
software, which automatically browses the World Wide Web, copying and 
indexing visited pages to update search engine data.200  The instructions provided 
by robots.txt specify files and data that should or should not be accessed by 
crawling bots.201  Usefully, these instructions prevent harvesting of personal 
identifying information for privacy purposes and prevent access to copyrighted 
works for purposes of copyright protection.202  At the same time, robots.txt can 
also be used to enable infringement with the proper instructio
It is not clear whether robots.txt was intended to “identify or protect copyrighted 
works,” so a court might not find that this technology could qualify as a standard 
technical measure under § 512(i).203  At the same time, the statute does not specify 
that “standard technical measures” must have been developed solely, or even 
partly, to identify and protect copyrighted works.  It may be enough that a broad 
consensus now exists among copyright owners and service providers who do in fact 
use robots.txt for the purpose of identifying and protecting copyrighted works.204  
Viewed in this light, robots.txt meets the three-pronged definition:  it was 
developed through an open collaborative effort and is entirely voluntary; it is 
reasonably available to any person; and it does not impose substantial costs or 
burdens.205  However, given its potential infringing uses on one hand and changing 
technology on the other, robots.txt may soon outlive its usefulness as a “standard 
technical measure.” 
Currently, Internet publishers have been devising a similar but more expansive 
system called the Automated Content Access Protocol (ACAP), which will 
supplement the Robots Exclusion Protocol with more specific instructions to guide 
Web crawling software and “dictate the terms under which [written] content can be 
used and displayed.”206  Specifically, ACAP can: 
describe restrictions on the number of words that third parties are permitted to display 
in a text snippet, prohibit annotations like user ratings or tags, prohibit conversion to 
alternate formats like PDF, limit the use of typographical style and formatting 
changes, restrict translation, [and] insist that the content can only be displayed in a 
consensus on 30 June 1994 on the robots mailing list (robots-request@nexor.co.uk), between the 
majority of robot authors and other people with an interest in robots”); Rick DeJarnette, Robots 
Exclusion Protocol:  Joining Together to Provide Better Documentation, BING COMMUNITY (June 3, 
2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.bing.com/community/blogs/webmaster/archive/2008/06/03/robots-
exclusion-protocol-joining-together-to-provide-better-documentation.aspx. 
 199. DeJarnette, supra note 198. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. ACAP Ars Technica, supra note 155. 
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2) (2006). 
 204. See DeJarnette, supra note 198.  In fact, as may have been the case in Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007), robots.txt could be used to instead facilitate infringement.  
Robots.txt metatags can be set to “don’t crawl,” such that Web crawlers searching for infringing works 
will bypass the site or sites where infringing work is located. 
 205. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A)–(C). 
 206. ACAP Ars Technica, supra note 155. 
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frame that replicates the exact conditions of the original source.207 
Though the system is entirely voluntary, consistent with the § 512(i)(2)(A) 
requirements, it may nonetheless prove unduly burdensome to agree upon in 
practice.  The sophisticated metadata restrictions would impose a huge number of 
restrictions on search engines, limiting whether and how certain materials can be 
copied and displayed, without regard for the actual, often fair, use of those 
materials.208  More recently, Jon Stokes, also of Ars Technica, characterized ACAP 
as “a bit like robots.txt—but on illegal steroids that cause anger management issues 
and can precipitate bouts of violence and heart problems.”209  Furthermore, ACAP 
has yet to be endorsed by any mainstream search engine companies, running far 
afoul of the central criteria that the measures be “developed pursuant to a broad 
consensus of copyright owners and service providers.”210 
Google has also introduced its own metadata standards:  “Rich Snippets,” which 
will collect and apply information like user ratings, content samples and other data 
that publishers are willing to share.211  Unsurprisingly, Google’s modus operandi is 
to collect more information in order to improve search engine function and use, 
rather than to limit collected information in the interests of privacy or copyright 
protection.212  
The Associated Press and Media Standards Trust have introduced a third new 
text-based metadata format:  “Value Added News,” which operates somewhere 
between the reader friendly Rich Snippets and right holder friendly ACAP scale, 
attaching both rights information and snippets of text to copyrighted works.213   
These protocols are limited to print media, as they attach to text and not audio, 
visual or audiovisual works.214  Thus, while Value Added News might address the 
concerns of news publishers—the print media group hardest hit by the digital age—
the relevant protocols will not appease the UMGs and Viacoms of the world and 
will doubtfully garner a broad enough consensus to satisfy the statutory 
requirements for “standard technical measures.”215  Although Congress probably 
did not contemplate universal satisfaction when it mandated an “open, fair and 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Jon Stokes, European Publishers Want a Law to Control Online News Access, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 10, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/07/european-publishers-
want-news-access-controls-legislated.ars.  Ryan Paul of Ars Technica supposes that the burden of 
implementation costs and use limitations of ACAP will prevent its implementation by most search 
engines.  ACAP Ars Technica, supra note 155. 
 210. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 211. Introducing Rich Snippets, GOOGLE (May 12, 2009), http://googlewebmastercentral. 
blogspot.com/2009/05/ introducing-rich-snippets.html. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Stokes, supra note 209. 
 214. ACAP Executive Summary, ACAP (June 2008), http://www.the-acap.org/Files/25/25c1462a-
b7c8-44bb-997f-be53e5ed73ed.pdf (noting that “[i]n future it will be extended to cover other types of . . 
. content (including video and audio).”). 
 215. Stephanie Chen, Newspapers Fold as Readers Defect and Economy Sours, CNN (Mar. 19, 
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-19/us/newspaper.decline.layoff_1_newspaper-industry-tucson-
citizen-journalism?_s=PM:US. 
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collaborative” agreement, it probably did expect measures that would rectify 
copyright infringement of audio and visual works in addition to written works. 
This is not to dismiss these developments as fruitless.  The statute does provide 
for “standard technical measures,” not a singular measure.216  There will likely 
need to be multiple technologies to address the multiple needs of multiple 
industries.  Internet publishers are alone in developing open standards for this 
purpose.  The film, television and music production industries have not taken 
affirmative steps to develop an “ACAP equivalent” to use in concert with UGCs 
and other service providers.  Unlike Web publishers, production companies cannot 
embed rights information into already published content.217  More importantly, 
these parties continue to dispute the efficiency of protective technology measures 
that currently do exist.218  Arguably, in light of these conflicting interests and 
technological limitations, any resolution of “standard technical measures” to 
protect audiovisual copyrighted works may be impossible without FCC 
rulemaking, despite its incongruity with the statutory requirement for 
voluntariness.219 
But neither “voluntary” nor any other statutory requirement in § 512(i)(2) has 
garnered any definitive legal definition.  For example, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill 
LLC, the Ninth Circuit was unable to determine whether preventing access to a 
website interfered with a “standard technical measure” within the meaning of the 
statute.220  In that case, CCBill blocked Perfect 10’s access to CCBill affiliated 
websites, claiming that Perfect 10 had ceased to pay for access.221  Unable to 
determine whether accessing a website is a “standard technical measure” satisfying 
the requirements of § 512(i)(2), the court remanded to the district court to 
determine first, whether the ability to access websites is a standard technical 
measure with which CCBill interfered, and second, whether CCBill blocked access 
because Perfect 10 had previously reversed subscription charges or because CCBill 
wanted to interfere with Perfect 10’s ability to police for infringement.222  Because 
Perfect 10 needed to view the website in order to properly “identify or protect 
[their] copyrighted works,” the argument proceeded, this ability constitutes a 
 216. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 217. On the other hand, audio and video “watermarking” embeds preproduction digital audio files 
with a unique identifier or “signature” such that the files can be traced to their source if they are later 
found in a torrent stream or other unauthorized location.  What it Does and Who it Is For, 
AUDIOWATERMARKING.INFO, http://audiowatermarking.info (last visited Nov. 3, 2010); see also, 
Balkin, supra note 16 (“Viacom can digitally watermark its video content (and does so) so that Google 
can filter any Viacom clips uploaded to YouTube, identify them as Viacom files and block them.  In 
other words, instead of using individual notice and takedown, the entire system can be automated using 
watermarking plus filtering.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“If there is 
a way to write a program that can identify and thus control infringing videos, plaintiffs are free to 
demonstrate it, with or without reference to the way [YouTube’s] Video ID program works.”). 
 219. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
 220. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
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standard technical measure within the meaning of the statute.223  On remand, the 
court would have determined whether granting free access to copyright owners 
would constitute a “substantial cost” on service providers and therefore was outside 
the proscribed definition of a “standard technical measure.”224  But the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari, so this question remains unresolved.225 
The court in CCBill did, however, rule on the “reasonableness” required for 
implementing repeat infringer termination policies required by § 512(i)(1)(A) “by 
borrowing the knowledge standard of § 512(c)(1)(A).”226  The court held that, 
absent declarations under penalty of perjury that Perfect 10’s agent had a “good 
faith belief” that the user was infringing, their notices of infringement did not 
provide a valid basis for terminating users.227  This interpretive tactic may provide 
the closest approximation of how courts will continue to apply § 512(i)(2)(A) as 
well.  The courts should determine that the “open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry 
standards process” required by the statute should also be governed by a good faith 
requirement.  In this way, a holdout party would have to show a good faith effort to 
avoid “substantial costs” and “substantial burdens,” rather than simply asserting 
either one or refusing to participate in a consensus.228  At a minimum, Congress 
must have anticipated some mechanism for developing these standards without the 
help of SDOs or unanimous agreement between all of the widely dispersed, 
affected parties.  Politics aside, one should not assume that Congress deliberately 
created a statutory “filibuster” for limiting the development of standard technical 
measures for digital copyright infringement. 
IV.  WHAT “STANDARD TECHNICAL MEASURES” MIGHT LOOK 
LIKE 
Section 512(i) provides “Conditions for Safe Harbor Eligibility.”229  Though not 
mandatory per se, these requirements provide the quid pro quo for service providers 
to operate despite user copyright infringements enabled by their services.  Like the 
 223. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2) (2006); CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1115. 
 224. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(C); CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1115. 
 225. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, 552 U.S. 1062 (2007) (denying petition for writ of certiori).  For 
another application of this argument, see, e.g., Viacom Complaint 1, supra note 44 (alleging that 
YouTube interferes with standard technical measures by allowing users to restrict access to their posted 
content through privacy settings) (cited by Brandon Brown, Fortifying the Safe Harbors:  Reevaluating 
the DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 460 (2008)).  As Brown acknowledges, 
these decisions are closely related to user privacy and site functionality.  Brown, supra at 460–61.  A 
ruling that they “interfere with standard technical measures” would compel UGCs to eliminate 
fundamental privacy features, compromising user rights, in order to remain eligible for safe harbor 
protection.  Brown, supra at 462.  These allegations remain in Viacom’s amended complaint.  First 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages and Demand for Jury Trial at 5, 
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008) (No. 07-CV-02103), 2008 
WL 2062868 (“YouTube allows its users to make the hidden videos available to others through other 
YouTube features like the ‘embed,’ ‘share,’ and ‘friends’ functions.”). 
 226. CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1115. 
 227. Id. at 1114. 
 228. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(C). 
 229. Id. § 512(i). 
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notice-and-takedown provisions of § 512(c), which require that the service provider 
respond to right holder notifications of infringement, § 512(i)(1)(B) requires that 
the service providers “accommodate and not interfere with standard technical 
measures . . . that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect works.”230  
This accommodation constitutes a passive obligation on the part of service 
providers.  The right holders, not the service providers, are expected to implement 
and apply these measures.231  However, service providers are expected to 
participate in an “open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process” in order 
to develop and establish them.232  As discussed above, this agreement has not been 
forthcoming among audio and visual right holders and service providers.233   
While the ideal option is probably to establish a standards development 
organization in the vein of the DVD CCA, as Congress anticipated and as Professor 
Samuelson espouses, these conversations have yet to begin more than a decade 
after passage of the statute.234  Pending these discussions, ad hoc groups will most 
likely assume responsibility for establishing “standard technical measures” 
consistent with the statute.235  The most prominent of these groups—the parties 
behind the UGC Principles—hold significant bargaining power in this process.  In 
light of their posture and their existing practice, the fingerprinting technology 
widely used throughout the industry will provide the most likely resolution to the 
statutory uncertainty behind § 512(i).  Nonetheless, the technology remains 
imperfect. 
Fingerprinting technology meets the statute’s four requirements.236  First, it is 
used to identify and, most often, to protect copyrighted works.237  Second, it is 
supported by the UGC Principles, which name all of the major broadcast networks 
and many of the major UGC sites as supporters and therefore have garnered a fairly 
large consensus.238  Third, the technology is already widely used and at least one 
fingerprinting producer, Audible Magic, offers free identification technology to 
smaller UGCs.239  Last, the widespread use of the technology, and its free 
availability, probably mitigates the additional burdens of licensing and 
implementation costs. 
Congress conceded that the development of standard technical measures could 
occur through ad hoc groups, provided the process was open, fair, voluntary and 
multi-industry.240  An open standards body is therefore not required to satisfy the 
 230. Id. § 512(c), (i)(2). 
 231. Id. § 512(i)(1)(B); see also id. § 512(c), (m). 
 232. Id. § 512(i)(2)(A). 
 233. As discussed, ACAP probably presents the best solution for text based media protection, 
though it has yet to attract the requisite broad consensus.  See supra Part II. 
 234. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52 (1998); Samuelson, supra note 183, at 34. 
 235. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B). 
 236. Sawyer, supra note 170, at 396–97. 
 237. See supra Part I. 
 238. See UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 239. Press Release: Audible Magic Broadens Reach with Free Service for UGC Websites, 
AUDIBLE MAGIC, (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.audiblemagic.com/news/press-releases/pr-2008-04-08.asp. 
 240. S.  REP. 105-190 (1998). 
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first of the three § 512(i)(2) requirements.241  The second and third requirements—
availability and minimal burden—are probably conditional on satisfying the 
first.242  Thus, one cannot reasonably predict whether technical measures are 
available on “nondiscriminatory terms” and without “substantial burden” or 
“substantial cost” until this initial qualification is met.  The arrangement and 
juxtaposition of these requirements suggests that the multi-industry participants 
themselves will be responsible for determining what constitutes a “discriminatory 
term” and a “substa
The UGC Principles serve as a collaborative statement among leading copyright 
owners and service providers of audio and video content.243  As such, their 
endorsed technology, “Identification Technology,” may satisfy the first of the three 
§  512(i)(2) requirements.244  Though the leading UGC, YouTube, is notably 
absent from the agreement, this single holdout should not be dispositive.  “Broad 
consensus” does not mean, and could not reasonably be interpreted to mean, 
“unanimous consensus.”  Rather, the plain meaning of “broad” definitively 
excludes this reading.245  Even if YouTube were to induce an open standards 
filibuster, its holding out would not disqualify fingerprinting technology from being 
a “standard technical measure.”  YouTube, after all, employs fingerprinting 
technology of its own.246 
This is the problem with fingerprinting:  the disagreement lies not in the nature 
of the technology, but in its protocol.  Fingerprinting technology is not used 
consistently between or among service providers or right holders.  In some 
instances, the matches are used to filter content and thus act on it before it becomes 
available.247  In other instances, the matches occur after user uploading, and are 
used to facilitate the notice-and-takedown process.248  Furthermore, what 
constitutes a “match” for either purpose remains uncertain and likely inconsistent.  
What Viacom considers a “match,” for instance, probably significantly differs from 
what YouTube deems a “match.”249  Finally, the actions taken once a match is 
made—blocking, removing access, licensing use, sending notification or doing 
nothing—also vary.250  These decisions remain “best practice” determinations.251  
A “standard technical measure” would require some consensus regarding 
application in addition to technical platform; though the technology may already 
exist, the terms of its use in policing infringement may create the greatest source of 
controversy. 
 241. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A)–(C) (2006). 
 242. Id. § 512(i)(2)(B)–(C). 
 243. See UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55. 
 244. Id. 
 245. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 177 (3d ed. 1993) (defining “broad” as “wide in 
extent from side to side” and “covering a broad scope; general”). 
 246. Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 108. 
 247. See, e.g., id.; see also Viacom Interview, supra note 107. 
 248. Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 108; Viacom Interview, supra note 107. 
 249. Viacom Complaint 1, supra note 44. 
 250. See Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 108; Viacom Interview, supra note 107. 
 251. Viacom Interview, supra note 107 
GALLO - FINAL 2/28/2011  5:59:34 PM 
314 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:2 
 use content. 
 
Berkeley fellow Michael S. Sawyer has argued that filtering fingerprinting 
technology used to block content identifications would come at too high a price to 
fair use.252  He argues that the technical content identification process prevents a 
meaningful fair use evaluation.253 Alternatively, MotionDSP’s Sean Varah 
suggests that some, albeit minimal, fair use review could take place: automated 
audio or visual matches of audiovisual works would not produce an infringing 
“match” if the corresponding audio or video in the online content did not also 
match.254  For instance, a mashup of copyrighted images remixed to a song or 
sounds in the public domain would pass as fair use.255  This automated response 
would inevitably prove both overinclusive and underinclusive because it would 
overlook infringing derivative and low quality content and would still “match” with 
some fair
Fundamentally, technologic binary review cannot satisfy the highly complex and 
delicate process of fair use evaluation.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation has 
responded to the UGC Principles with its own Fair Use Principles, which would 
similarly adjust the standards for determining and treating “matches” to better 
accommodate user freedoms.256  These interests will necessarily be a part of the 
“open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry” discussion between service providers and 
right holders.257  A cornerstone of Title 17, awareness of fair use, has grown 
throughout the industry; even the UGC Principles name accommodating fair use as 
one of their three main objectives.258  Ultimately, the resulting “standard technical 
measure” must represent the most viable compromise. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  REALIZING THE BROAD CONSENSUS 
Despite their competing interests, right holders and UGCs already employ audio 
and video fingerprinting technology as the standard measure to police copyright 
infringement.  Given its preexisting universal use, fingerprinting technology should 
be taken to satisfy the qualifications for “standard technical measures” set out in § 
512(i), so that right holders and service providers both may be on notice of their 
statutory obligations.  The “broad consensus” mandated by the statute has already 
 252. Sawyer, supra note 170, at 395. 
 253. Id. at 388. 
 254. E-mail from Sean Varah, supra note 129. 
 255. Ryan B., Mashup:  A Fair Use Defense, YALE L. & TECH. (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.yalelawtech.org/ip-in-the-digital-age/mashup-a-fair-use-defense (contesting the holding in 
Bridgeport and arguing that mashups should not be considered per se infringing); ContentID and Fair 
Use, BROADCASTING OURSELVES (Apr. 22, 2010), http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/ 2010/04/content-
id-and-fair-use.html (conceding that ContentID can’t identify context “(like ‘educational use’ or 
‘parody’),” which would be considered fair use).  But see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 
410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that use of even one second of copyrighted song constitutes 
infringement).  See also Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617 (2008) (discussing 
technically infringing but unenforced use of copyrighted works). 
 256. Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
http://www.eff.org/issues/ip-and-free-speech/fair-use-principles-usergen (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 257. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 258. UGC PRINCIPLES, supra note 55, ¶ 3(d), (f). 
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been reached, and the cost and burden requirements have been implicitly satisfied 
by that consensus.259  The affected parties must simply realize their unspoken 
agreement. 
True, right holders and UGCs continue to contest the effectiveness of 
fingerprinting technology to conduct general monitoring and to accommodate fair 
use.260  They also refuse to disclose their respective independent applications of 
that technology.  Therefore, the most probable next step will be to garner a broad 
consensus for a standard protocol to employ this technology.  In keeping with 
Congress’s expectation, interested parties should begin to expound this agreement 
as soon as possible, regardless of individual holdouts or the absence of a standards 
development body, and ideally without intervention by the FCC.  The standards for 
determining a “match” and how to treat such matches must be agreed upon in light 
of the crucial interests at stake:  protection of copyright, privacy and fair use. 
 
 259. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A). 
 260. See, e.g., Viacom Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 33; Balkin, supra note 16. 
